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FARM HOUSEHOLD RISK BALANCING:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND 
Abstract 
This paper presents the first empirical evidence on household risk balancing behavior, i.e., 
strategic off-farm decisions in response to changes in expected business risk. Using Swiss 
FADN data, we estimate a fixed effects seemingly unrelated regression model to analyze how 
farm households jointly alter their levels of debt, off-farm income and consumption. Evidence 
suggests that in response to changes in expected business risk, farm households make strategic 
off-farm decisions. Our study demonstrates that part of the behavioral risk response of farm 
households is ignored when focusing solely on farm-level analyses and illustrates the relevance 
of the household risk balancing framework. 
Keywords: Farm risk, off-farm risk, financial risk, off-farm income, consumption 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents the first empirical evidence on farm household risk balancing behavior, i.e. 
farm households making strategic off-farm decisions in response to exogenous changes in 
expected business risk (Wauters, et al., 2014). The observed unanticipated behavioral responses 
demonstrate the relevance of the household extension to the original risk balancing framework 
by Gabriel and Baker (1980). 
The original risk balancing framework describes a farmer’s strategic choice of the level of 
financial risk in response to exogenous changes in expected business risk. Business risk 
comprises any risk that can be experienced (and managed) at the operational level (e.g., price 
risk, production risk, institutional risk) and is considered independent from the way the farm is 
financed. The financial structure of the farm implies additional financial risk stemming from 
the fixed financial debt obligations. The sum or product of business risk and financial risk 
constitutes the total farm-level risk. 
The original risk balancing framework has had several theoretical extensions—most 
notably the utility-centric model by Collins (1985)—and empirical applications in 
predominantly US-based research. Recently, Wauters, et al. (2014) extended the risk balancing 
framework to the household level by analytically showing that exogenous changes in the farm’s 
business risk position might just as well induce changes in household buffering strategies aside 
from changes in the level of farm financial risk. It is widely recognized that farm households 
have several buffering strategies at their disposal that smooth the variation in total household 
income, including earning off-farm income (e.g. Jetté-Nantel, et al., 2011), smoothing 
consumption levels (e.g. Mishra, et al., 2002), seeking off-farm investments (e.g. Serra, et al., 
2004) or maintaining liquidity buffers (e.g. Remble, et al., 2013). Household risk balancing 
thus involves strategic changes in any of these buffering strategies in response to exogenous 
changes in expected business risk while aiming to stabilize total household risk. 
This paper will present the first empirical application of the household risk balancing 
framework using Swiss farm accountancy data network (FADN) data. Although many papers 
have acknowledged the importance of farm household risk exposure and management in 
European agricultural economics research (e.g. Cafiero, et al., 2007, Vrolijk, et al., 2009), 
empirical applications explicitly recognizing the possibility of simultaneous adoption and the 
potential correlation between different on- and off-farm responses are limited which is not 
surprising given that only a few of the countries in the FADN network have the required data 
on both on-farm and off-farm activities of farm households. Switzerland is a very interesting 
  
case study because off-farm employment opportunities have been readily available to Swiss 
farmers in recent years and currently off-farm income thus constitutes nearly a third of total 
household income (FOAG, 2013). 
2. Swiss Agricultural Production, Risk Exposure and Policies 
Although the relative economic importance of agriculture is low in Switzerland—0.7% of 
Switzerland’s GDP and below 4% of the employment rate was provided by agriculture in 
2011—it is of great importance for the country’s rural landscape as farming takes up nearly a 
quarter of the surface area (OECD, 2013). The dominant farm structure is the small family farm 
and dairy farms constitute the most prevalent farm typology. Intensive forms of farming are 
present in the valley region, compared to more extensive systems in the hills and mountain 
regions.  
Swiss agriculture is highly protected, due to several agricultural policy measures in place 
(e.g. market price support and border protection). Although Switzerland has progressively 
reduced its support to farmers over time, overall government support remains high. This can be 
reflected in the high OECD producer support estimates (PSE) at 55% in 2011, which is almost 
three times the OECD (19%) or EU (17%) average (OECD, 2013). 
A consequence of the high level of government protection and support is that Swiss farmers 
are less exposed to market price risk than their colleagues in neighboring countries and also 
makes them less vulnerable to climate volatility. Accordingly, Swiss agricultural gross revenues 
and household incomes are rather stable (El Benni, et al., 2012). Regardless of the high level 
of income support, however, Swiss farmers do earn a lower income compared to other 
industries. For the 2010-2012 period, agricultural incomes reached between 41% (mountainous 
region) to 66% (plain region) of the comparable income earned in the industry or service sectors 
(Schmid and Roesch, 2013). Lips, et al. (2013) show for Swiss dairy farms that farmer’s family 
members earn double the on-farm income per full-time employee when they work off-farm. 
The income composition of Swiss farm households has also changed over the last years: 
between 2003/04 and 2010/10 the agricultural income was almost stable at CHF 57,500, yet at 
the same time the off-farm income increased by 34% reaching CHF 20,000 (Lips and Schmid, 
2013). The question arises, however, whether this increased reliance on off-farm income 
involves a risk-reduction strategy. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model Rationale 
Risk balancing behavior entails strategic decisions in response to exogenous changes in the 
expected level of business risk. The original Gabriel and Baker (1980) risk balancing 
framework focusses solely on financial responses (i.e., changes in the level of debt), whereas 
the extended household risk balancing framework goes beyond the original framework by also 
considering strategic off-farm responses (Wauters, et al., 2014). These responses include 
changes in off-farm income, consumption levels, off-farm investments or liquidity buffers that 
determine the level of off-farm risk. Given the unavailability of data for the latter two responses, 
we will focus on off-farm income and consumption. We further assume that farmers form their 
expectations of future business risk based on past exposure to business risk.  
Our overall regression rationale to analyze household risk balancing is thus regressing 
changes in past levels of business risk on three strategic decisions made by the farm household: 
(i) the level of financial risk, (ii) the amount of off-farm income earned and (iii) farm household 
consumption. We expect to find a negative relationship for financial risk in line with the original 
risk balancing hypothesis (increased expected business risk results in lowered financial risk). 
  
Consistent with household risk balancing, we would expect farm households to lower off-farm 
risk in response to an increase in expected business risk by acquiring more off-farm income 
(positive relationship) and smoothing consumption levels (negative relationship). We further 
control for several additional risk balancing, farm(er) and household related characteristics 
based on literature. The definitions and expected signs of these regressors will be discussed in 
section 4.2. 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
First, we look at the original risk balancing hypothesis and estimate the following two-way 
fixed effects model (de Mey, et al., 2014): 
 𝑭𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝑩𝑹(𝑩𝑹)𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 (1) 
where i and t are indexing farm and year, FR represents our dependent variable financial risk, 
BR characterizes our main variable of interest business risk and its βBR associated coefficient, β 
represents the coefficient vector of the explanatory variables x elaborated above and μ, λ and ε 
symbolize the farm-specific, year-specific and idiosyncratic error terms respectively. By 
estimating a fixed effects regression model, we make use of the panel structure of our dataset 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity that varies across farms but does not change over time 
and vice versa. Note that due to using lagged values of business risk (to represent expectations) 
it is considered purely exogenous. 
Next, we look at household risk balancing by considering the three following equations 
that reflect strategic responses to exogenous changes in business risk: 
 𝑭𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝑩𝑹
𝟏 (𝑩𝑹)𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷
𝟏𝒙𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊
𝟏 + 𝝀𝒕
𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕
𝟏  (2) 
 𝑶𝑭𝑰𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝑩𝑹
𝟐 (𝑩𝑹)𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷
𝟐𝒙𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊
𝟐 + 𝝀𝒕
𝟐 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  (3) 
 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝑩𝑹
𝟑 (𝑩𝑹)𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷
𝟑𝒙𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊
𝟑 + 𝝀𝒕
𝟑 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕
𝟑  (4) 
where OFI and CONS represent our dependent variables off-farm income and consumption, all 
other symbols are defined as before and the superscripts 1, 2 and 3 are introduced to refer to the 
financial risk, off-farm income and consumption equations respectively. 
We will estimate equations 2 to 4 in a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
(Zellner, 1962) which captures the efficiency of modeling the correlation of the disturbances 
across equations. As our three equations represent decisions made by the same entity (the farm 
household), they cannot be considered to be autonomous and hence 3SLS estimates are not 
appropriate (Wooldridge, 2010: 239). As household risk balancing prescribes that a farm 
household simultaneously changes financial risk, off-farm income and consumption levels, we 
have no reason to hold any of the other two household responses fixed as would be the case in 
a 3SLS model. We account for the panel structure of the dataset by manually applying a within 
transformation to the data (i.e., subtracting the within-farm mean from each variable). 
One potential problem when following a SUR approach is heteroskedasticity, which leads 
to inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we will also estimate our system of SUR equations using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) with a weight matrix that specifically controls for 
heteroskedasticity and using the explanatory variables as instruments. 
4. Data 
4.1. Sample Description 
  
Our empirical analysis makes use of the Swiss farm accountancy data network (FADN) dataset, 
which is collected and analyzed by Agroscope Reckenholz–Tänikon Research Station ART 
(Schmid and Roesch, 2013). The comprehensive database includes detailed information based 
on cost accounting and covers 10 years from 2003 to 2012. An unbalanced panel dataset is 
compiled from this source by selecting those farms that (i) do not have missing values for the 
key variables needed for estimation (ii) are present in the dataset at least four consecutive years 
(to calculate the lagged value of business risk, which in turn is calculated over 3 years), (iii) 
have a positive farm income (given the problematic calculation of the coefficient of variation 
of negative values) and (iv) do not present outlying values. The following observations were 
considered as outliers: financial risk measures greater than one, implausible consumption 
levels, negative values of interest paid or ROA and extreme level of farm income. Our final 
regression sample contains 12,827 observations covering 3,184 farms over 7 years, 23.4% of 
which are present the entire period.  
4.2. Variables Definition and Expected Signs 
The three main dependent variables in this study are financial risk, off-farm income and 
consumption. In line with Gabriel and Baker (1980), Financial risk is measured as the ratio of 
interest paid over farm income. Farm income represents the remuneration of family owned 
capital, labor and land and is calculated by subtracting intermediate costs, depreciation, wages 
paid, rent paid for land and interest paid from gross revenue including subsidies and taxes. Off-
farm income comprises all income sources earned off-farm that are actively chosen by the farm 
household: wages earned by self-employment, wages earned by employment and income from 
investments. These income sources account for 60% of total reported off-farm income on 
average and exclude sources such as social transfers, pensions or inheritances that farm 
households do not actively choose themselves. Consumption measures the total monetary level 
of consumption of the family members living on the farm (it includes the categories insurance 
costs, car costs, housing costs, social contributions and other consumption including food 
expenditures). 
Our main independent variable of interest, business risk (BR), is represented by the 
coefficient of variation of farm income before interest payments. We thus define risk in terms 
of the variability of outcomes and assume that farmers form their expectations of future business 
risk based on past levels of variation in income. Note that observed past level of variation only 
represent part of the potential risk that farmers faced. The coefficient of variation is calculated 
over a moving 3-year window. The 3-year period was chosen because business risk measures 
calculated over 4-year and 5-year periods were highly correlated (80%) with the 3-year 
measure. Hence, in order to retain as much observations as possible (recall that our dataset is 
unbalanced), we only considered 3-year measures. For our descriptive results in section 5.1, we 
additionally calculated total farm risk (TRf) as the 3-year coefficient of variation of farm income 
and total household risk (TRhh) as the 3-year coefficient of variation of household income, 
which is simply the sum of farm income and off-farm income. 
The original risk balancing related independent variables are past values of the cost of debt, 
profitability and liquidity. The cost of debt is represented by the interest percentage paid on 
loans (interest paid over total outstanding debt). Profitability is measured by the rate of return 
on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of farm income over total assets. Liquidity is 
characterized by the monetary value of current assets. In our financial risk equation, we expect 
to find a negative relationship with past levels of profitability and a positive relationship with 
past levels of debt costs and liquidity (Gabriel and Baker, 1980).  
  
The off-farm elements considered in this study are the existence of extra off-farm income, 
the units of consumption, the amount of children and the educational level of the farm operator. 
OFI incomplete is a dummy variable indicating whether additional off-farm income earned by 
the farm household was not completely reported under off-farm income. This variable mainly 
acts as a control variable, it should clearly be positively related to off-farm income and 
consumption. The amount of consumption units (UC) represents the standardized number of 
family members in the farm household. The householder accounts for one UC, other family 
members of 14 years or older account for 0.5 UC and 0.3 UC for children below the age of 14. 
Aside from an obvious positive influence on consumption, we would also expect a positive 
influence of household size on off-farm income as larger farm families can more easily share 
the on-farm work—making more time available for off-farm work—and potentially have some 
family members willing to fully work off-farm (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997, Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2004). The variable children -16 additionally counts the number of children below the 
age of 16 that are part of the farm household. This variable captures the effect of having a higher 
composition of children in the household as we also control for the amount of UC. Accordingly, 
we expect a negative influence on off-farm income as children below the age of 16 are 
considered too young to work and a positive influence on consumption as having more children 
tends to increase the required household budget. An educational dummy represents whether the 
farm operator has had some form of household-related or nonagricultural education (e.g. an 
apprenticeship, a professional training, a mastercraftship or training at a technical college or 
university) or is currently in education. Having a formal education increases the amount of off-
farm jobs available and hence potentially increases the amount of off-farm income that can be 
earned (Woldehanna, et al., 2000, Alasia, et al., 2009). 
The farm(er) related variables considered in this study are direct payments, farm size, land 
tenure, age, farm income, liquidity and equity. In our financial risk model, % Direct payments 
represents the share of direct payments received in total gross revenue. This alternative 
formulation was chosen to prevent multicollinearity problems with farm size as direct payments 
are tied to farm area. This form of government support can be considered as a stable and thus 
low-risk income source. In that sense, they would allow farmers to increase debt usage in line 
with the original risk balancing hypothesis. In the off-farm income and consumption regression, 
direct payments simply represent the monetary amount of direct payments received. Previous 
research has suggested that government subsidies (coupled or decoupled) reduce off-farm labor 
participation (Ahearn, et al., 2006). Therefore we would expect a negative influence of direct 
payments on off-farm income obtained in addition to a logical positive influence on 
consumption levels. Farm size measures the total area of the farm used for production in 
hectares. Previous research has suggested a positive relationship with debt usage (de Mey, et 
al., 2014) and negative with off-farm income (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007, Alasia, et al., 2009). 
Larger farms potentially have higher consumption levels due to economies of scale allowing 
for increased income per family member. Land tenure represents the percentage of land under 
tenure of the farm household and is measured as the ratio of owned land over total farm size. 
As agricultural land prices are generally high in Switzerland (e.g. Giuliani and Rieder, 2003), 
we expect farm households who own a larger percentage of their land to have higher debt usage 
and would be motivated to gain more off-farm income. Age is the age of the farm operator, age² 
was also included in our models to account for potential second-order effects. We expect 
farmers prefer to decrease investments and pay off their debts as they become older and hence 
a negative relationship with financial risk. The relation with off-farm income is less clear to 
predict a-priori, however, as older farmers might have more difficulties finding an off-farm job 
(Goodwin and Mishra, 2004), but this potential decrease in hours worked off-farm might be 
compensated by increased hours worked on-farm and therefore complemented with off-farm 
income gained by the other household members. We anticipate that farm households with low 
  
amounts of farm income compensate by gaining more off-farm income (and vice-versa) and 
that getting more farm income has a positive influence on consumption levels. To take the 
typical consumption-saving tradeoff into account, we include the monetary amount of current 
assets as a proxy for savings in absence of more detailed information regarding the savings 
behavior of the farm households (assuming that part of the yearly amount saved ends up under 
current assets in the balance sheet as cash on a checking or savings account). Finally, we include 
equity as a proxy measure to take differences regarding household wealth into account. Equity 
represents the monetary amount of assets owned privately by the farm household (note that no 
clear distinction is made in the dataset between farm equity and farm household equity) and is 
expected to have a positive influence on consumption levels.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Unit 
Dependent variables    
Financial risk (FR) 0.13 0.15 Ratio 
Off-farm income (OFI) 1.42 2.26 104 CHF 
Consumption (CONS) 7.34 2.64 104 CHF 
Risk balancing    
Business risk (BR) 0.21 0.15 Coefficient of variation 
Interest% 1.93 2.18 % 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.09 0.07 Ratio 
Current Assets 1.22 0.93 105 CHF 
Off-farm elements    
OFI Incomplete 0.25 0.43 Dummy 
Consumption Units (UC) 3.52 1.46 UC 
Children -16 1.05 1.35 Children 
Education 0.10 0.30 Dummy 
Farm(er) related    
Direct Payments 6.06 2.76 104 CHF 
% Direct Payments 0.26 0.13 Ratio 
Area 25.61 12.83 Ha 
Tenure 0.64 0.28 Ratio 
Age 48.21 8.37 Years 
Farm Income 6.91 4.03 104 CHF 
Equity 5.33 3.51 105 CHF 
Notes: All monetary values deflated to 2012 values using the Swiss Federal Statistical Office CPI 
(http://www.bfs.admin.ch), N = 12,827 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Risk Exposure in Swiss Agriculture over Time, Region and Farm Typology 
Figure 1 presents the volatility of the average levels of total farm risk, business risk and total 
household risk over the period 2005–2012. The general risk exposure—as measured by 
coefficients of variation between 0.20 and 0.25—in Swiss agriculture is low compared to other 
countries. de Mey, et al. (2014) report the EU-15 average farm-level business risk at 0.33 
(1995–2008), while Poon and Weersink (2011) report average levels of total farm risk of as 
high as 3.8 for Canada (2001–2006). Overall, there is little year-to-year variation in the average 
levels of risk, barring a small surge in the year 2010. The later can be explained by recalling 
that we calculate risk over three-year periods, hence the 2010 risk measure spans the years 
2008–2010, a period characterized by elevated prices for arable crops and milk, followed by a 
marked drop (Schmid and Roesch, 2013). The difference between business risk and total farm 
risk represents financial risk and the difference between total farm risk and total household risk 
represents off-farm risk. Whereas financial risk increases total farm risk relative to business by 
definition, off-farm risk can either stabilize or increase total household risk compared to total 
  
farm risk. On average, the relationship is a stabilizing one (average total household risk is lower 
than total farm risk), yet for 24% of the observations household-level risk is higher than farm-
level risk. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison over time of average 
total risk at the farm level (TRf), business risk 
(BR) and total risk at the household level 
(TRhh) 
Table 2. Comparison over farm typology and 
region of average total risk at the farm level 
(TRf), business risk (BR) and total risk at the 
household level (TRhh) 
 TRf BR TRhh N 
Farm Type     
Dairy 0.217 0.193 0.168 5,109 
Mixed 0.247 0.221 0.199 5,008 
Crops 0.268 0.234 0.190 1,784 
Animals 0.253 0.234 0.200 926 
Region     
Valley 0.244 0.219 0.199 5,639 
Hill 0.232 0.205 0.178 3,985 
Mountain 0.237 0.210 0.171 3,203 
Total 0.239 0.213 0.185 12,827 
Notes: The Swiss FADN distinguishes 11 types of 
farms (Hoop and Schmid, 2013). These types were 
classified as follows: dairy (21), mixed (51 to 54), crops 
(11 and 12) and animal (22, 23, 31 and 41) 
 
Table 2 compares the same risk measures from Figure 1 over farm typology and across the 
three distinct production regions in Switzerland. Four typologies were considered; dairy farms 
as these constitute the predominant farm type in Switzerland, and three general classes: mixed 
farms, crop based and animal based farms (other than dairy). We observe that the crop and 
animal based production types have above average levels of risk. A closer inspection of the data 
revealed that this is mainly accounted for by arable farms and pig farms, which are particularly 
susceptible to production risk (weather influences) and price risk (the hog cycle), respectively. 
Conversely, dairy farms have below average risk levels, which could be attributed to relatively 
stable milk prices—compared to the price volatility for crops and pork—and a higher share of 
direct payments. Differences across the production regions are less pronounced. One noticeable 
results is that the valley region has above average risk levels, as this is the region with most 
arable and pig farms and furthermore the share of direct payments in the farm’s turnover 
increases with the altitude. 
5.2. Regression Model Results on Farm-Level and Household-Level Risk Balancing Behavior 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of our fixed effects (FE), seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) and generalized method of moments (GMM) models. All econometric models 
were estimated using the statistical package Stata. There is no indication of multicollinearity 
problems in the data, the variance inflation factors (VIF) of all regressors are between 1 and 2. 
We have reason to assume heteroskedasticity is present, as a modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in fixed effects models (Greene, 2003: 598) for each individual equation 
indicated the presence of farm-specific error variances (α = 0.01). We therefore clustered our 
standard errors by farm in the FE model and will compare our SUR model results with the 
heteroskedasticity robust GMM model results. 
The first column in Table 3 presents the results of our original risk balancing FE regression 
model based on equation (1). We find no significant evidence that ceteris paribus Swiss farmers 
made strategic changes in financial risk in response to changes in expected business risk. A 
potential explanation for this finding is that interest rates have been low and stable in 
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Switzerland over the period under consideration (1.93% on average, Table 1). Debt was 
therefore easily available to Swiss farmers and hence the decision to change the level of 
financial risk was less driven by changes in business risk as it was not constrained. In line with 
our expectations from section 4.2, we find a negative relationship with past levels of 
profitability and a positive relationship with the share of direct payments, land tenure and past 
levels of liquidity. For area we find a significant negative yet small effect, where we would 
have expected a positive relationship as larger farmers generally have more access to credit. 
For age we would expect a negative relationship, yet obtain a positive coefficient that is only 
significant at 10% and is very low. 
Table 3. Parameter estimates for the determinants of the financial risk (FR), off-farm income 
(OFI) and consumption (CONS) decisions made by Swiss farm households for the period 2006–
2012 using fixed effects (FE), seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and generalized method of 
moments (GMM) models 
 FE  SUR  GMM 
 FR  FR OFI CONS  FR OFI CONS 
Risk balancing          
BRt-1 -0.0131  -0.0133** 0.2184*** -0.2107**  -0.0130 0.2191*** -0.2083** 
 (0.0103)  (0.0061) (0.0674) (0.0913)  (0.0085) (0.0689) (0.0991) 
Interest% t-1 -0.0314  -0.0003    -0.0003   
 (0.0231)  (0.0004)    (0.0002)   
ROA t-1 -0.1897***  -0.1964***    -0.1897***   
 (0.0307)  (0.0242)    (0.0247)   
Current Assets t-1 0.0060*  0.0055***    0.0060**   
 (0.0031)  (0.0017)    (0.0024)   
Off-farm elements          
OFI Incomplete    0.2161** 0.2294*   0.2159*** 0.2236** 
    (0.0885) (0.1198)   (0.0816) (0.1015) 
UC    0.0143 0.1720***   0.0143 0.1725*** 
    (0.0152) (0.0205)   (0.0135) (0.0230) 
Children -16    -0.0719*** 0.0494**   -0.0718*** 0.0502** 
    (0.0162) (0.0219)   (0.0194) (0.0228) 
Education    -0.1087    -0.1277  
    (0.1201)    (0.1236)  
Farm(er) related           
% Direct Payments 0.5055***  0.5128***    0.5055***   
 (0.0435)  (0.0252)    (0.0336)   
Area -0.0012**  -0.0012***    -0.0012**   
 (0.0006)  (0.0004)    (0.0005)   
Tenure 0.1305***  0.1303*** 0.1882 0.2035  0.1305*** 0.1876 0.1937 
 (0.0211)  (0.0137) (0.1491) (0.2020)  (0.0160) (0.1249) (0.2314) 
Age 0.0056*  0.0055** 0.1161*** 0.2262***  0.0056** 0.1161*** 0.2272*** 
 (0.0034)  (0.0024) (0.0278) (0.0376)  (0.0025) (0.0312) (0.0445) 
Age² -0.0001  -0.0001** -0.0013*** -0.0023***  -0.0001** -0.0013*** -0.0024*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0004)  (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Direct Payments    -0.0623*** 0.0673***   -0.0625*** 0.0657*** 
    (0.0133) (0.0180)   (0.0158) (0.0236) 
Farm Income    -0.0268*** 0.0874***   -0.0275*** 0.0818*** 
    (0.0040) (0.0054)   (0.0051) (0.0088) 
Current Assets    0.1083*** -0.0708***   0.1083*** -0.0710* 
    (0.0185) (0.0250)   (0.0284) (0.0417) 
Equity    0.0082 0.0183   0.0081 0.0179 
    (0.0099) (0.0134)   (0.0148) (0.0190) 
Constant -0.1643*  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0921)  (0.0006) (0.0066) (0.0089)  (0.0006) (0.0066) (0.0089) 
F/Chi² test statistic 19.3***  674*** 398*** 548***     
R² 0.0489  0.0489 0.0303 0.0383     
Wald test BRt-1= 0   χ²(3) = 21.46***  χ²(3) = 18.2*** 
Notes: Year dummies were included in each model but not reported for brevity, Standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered by farm for the FE model and robust for the GMM model), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01, N = 12,827 
  
The second column in Table 3 presents the results of our SUR regression models from 
equation (2) to (4). The correlation coefficients between the regression errors are low (0.0036, 
0.0223 and 0.0702), yet the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test of independence rejects 
the H0 that the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal (χ²(3) = 69.8***). Hence, our three 
equations cannot be considered independent and our SUR approach is appropriate as opposed 
to single equation estimation. Estimating the three equations in a system of regressions offers 
us a gain in efficiency and accordingly, we observe smaller standard errors in the FR equation 
compared to the estimates of the FE model. We find that expected business risk has a significant 
influence of the expected direction in each of the three equations and a joint Wald test 
furthermore confirms that the effect is also jointly significant (α = 0.01) across the three 
equations. However, as we have indications of the presence of heteroskedasticity, we will not 
further discuss our SUR results and turn to our heteroskedasticity robust GMM estimation 
results. 
The coefficient estimates of our robust GMM model—presented in the last column of Table 
3—are nearly identical to the SUR model estimates (as they should be, the slight differences 
are due to the different estimation approach of the SUR and GMM methods) yet the standard 
errors differ as we now take heteroskedasticity into account. A joint Wald test indicates that 
expected business risk still has a significant (α = 0.01) influence across all three equations. 
However, our robust results now indicate that expected business risk does not significantly 
influence financial risk decisions. We do find a significant positive influence on the level of 
off-farm income attained and a negative influence on consumption levels. The effects are small, 
however, as the model coefficients suggest that for an increase of 0.10 in expected business risk 
(a change of one within standard deviation), ceteris paribus, off-farm income increases with 
CHF 219 and consumption decreases with CHF 208. 
Although the other explanatory variables in our model are mainly added as control 
variables and are of secondary interest, we will briefly discuss their role in explaining changes 
in the dependent variables. In the financial risk equation, we obtain the same coefficients for 
the additional control variables compared to the FE. In the off-farm income equation we find 
that having a greater proportion of children in the household decreases off-farm income as 
hypothesized. In the category of farm(er) related control variables, we observe that farm 
households that have an older farm operator and that have more liquid assets have greater levels 
of off-farm income. Conversely, farms receiving more direct payments and that have greater 
levels of farm income attract lower levels of off-farm income, which is in line with literature 
(Ahearn, et al., 2006). Consumption levels are evidently greater in larger farm families and 
when the proportion of children below the age of 16 is higher. The farm operator’s age, the 
level of farm income earned and the amount of direct payments received are furthermore found 
to have a positive impact on changes in consumption. 
6. Conclusions 
Farm households have several off-farm buffering strategies at their disposal that allow them to 
influence the variation in total household income, such as earning off-farm income, smoothing 
consumption levels, seeking off-farm investments or maintaining liquidity buffers. In this light, 
household risk balancing behavior refers to strategic changes in household buffering in response 
to exogenous changes in the expected business risk of the farm (Wauters, et al., 2014). This 
household-level behavior complements original risk balancing behavior which comprises 
strategic changes in farm-level financial risk in response to the same exogenous changes in 
business risk (Gabriel and Baker, 1980).  
  
The main objective of this paper is presenting the first empirical evidence on farm 
household risk balancing behavior. Using Swiss FADN data, we estimate a robust fixed effects 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to analyze how farm households jointly alter their 
levels of financial risk, off-farm income and consumption. The evidence supports the notion 
that farm households make strategic farm and off-farm decisions in response to the exogenous 
changes in expected business risk. Our model coefficients suggest that for an increase of 0.10 
in expected business risk (a change of one within standard deviation), ceteris paribus, off-farm 
income increases with CHF 219 and consumption decreases with CHF 208. 
The results of our study demonstrate that when focusing solely on farm-level analyses, an 
interesting part of the behavioral risk response of farm households is largely ignored. As 
important farm household responses are not revealed, the full impact of risk-related policies in 
the European region (e.g. price stabilization or subsidized insurance schemes) cannot be 
assessed. Therefore, a farm household approach to policy analysis is of great importance 
(Offutt, 2002), and calls for a broadening of the agricultural statistics collection with household 
income data. Future research could analyze household risk balancing behavior in those member 
states of the EU that collect reliable information on off-farm aspects (e.g. The Netherlands, 
Vrolijk, et al., 2009). It would be valuable to compare results across countries as there surely 
are marked differences in off-farm opportunities, risk exposure and government support levels. 
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